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THE CONTEMPTUOUS ATTORNEY AND PROBLEMS
CONCERNING HIS SUMMARY PUNISHMENT UNDER
RULE 42 (a) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The contempt sentences imposed upon defense counsel in
the "Conspiracy Seven" Trial' have awakened a new interest in
the contempt proceeding, especially as it applies to attorneys.
The proceeding is said to be sui generis ;2 some describe it as an
anomaly in the law. Indeed, it is an offense created by the
courts' and recognized by many as an inherent power needed for

protection of the judicial system. 5 Recognition of the power in
the United States was given by Congress in the Judiciary Act
of 1789 which created the federal courts.8 Forty-two years later
Congress recognized a need for restrictions on the power with
7
the passage of an act limiting its use.
LUnited States v. Dellinger, No. 69 CR 180 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 15,
1970), appeal docketed, No. 1-8294, 7th Cir., Feb. 26, 1970, includes the
contempt citations against both Leonard Weinglass and William Kunstler
as well as against all the defendants in the case. Weinglass was found
guilty of 14 separate acts of contempt and Kunstler was found guilty of
24 separate acts.
2 Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1923); See note 10 infra for
a statement of the significance of this classification.
3 Mr. Justice Black so stated in his dissent in Green v. United States,
356 U.S. 165, 193-94 (1958) ; Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the dissent
which stated in part:
The power of a judge to inflict punishment for criminal contempt by
means of a summary proceeding stands as an anomaly in the law. In my
judgment the time has come for a fundamental and searching reconsideration of the validity of this power which has aptly been characterized
by a State Supreme Court as, "perhaps, nearest akin to despotic power
of any power existing under our form of government." . . . [I]t has become a drastic and pervasive mode of administering criminal justice
usurping our regular constitutional methods of trying those charged
with offenses against society.
The Court refers in its above quote to State ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Circuit
Court, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193, 194-5 (1897).
4See text discussion at note 101 infra. This contempt power has been
extended to other agencies because of their investigative powers: e.g., grand
juries, see Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959) ; Congressional Committees, see McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
Some states have bestowed this power upon administrative agencies,
e.g., Ex parte Sanford, 236 Mo. 665, 139 S.W. 376 (1911) which recognizes
the grant to a county board and In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 156 S.E. 791
(1931) which recognizes the power in an industrial commission.
5 The contempt power is felt to be an inherent power necessary to
preserve the authority of the court and to prevent the administration of
justice from falling into dispute. Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1948). The
power is an essential incident to maintenance of the court's authority and
administration and execution of its orders, People v. Loughran, 2 Ill. 2d 258,
118 N.E.2d 310 (1954). See note 107 supra.
8 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §17, 1 Stat. 83 states:
... That all the said courts of the United States shall have power to ...
punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same....
7 See text at note 36 infra and note 37 in!ra.
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A study of the case law brings to the fore several interesting

and perplexing issues, particularly concerning the procedures
employed in the punishment of contempt, especially the kind exhibited in the "Conspiracy Trial." This class of contempt is

punishable summarily, that is, without notice, hearing, or jury
trial."
After a brief discussion of the different types of contempts,
this comment will deal with the following topics: the type of

courtroom behavior on the part of counsel which has been found
to be criminally contemptuous and thus subject to summary
punishment; the nature of the summary procedure for punishment of direct criminal contempt; the history and rationale

behind the power; and the procedural safeguards which exist
to protect the contemnor against unreasonable use of this power

and their application in the courts.
Contempts are generally classified as civil or criminal.
The procedural and substantive rights accorded civil and criminal

contemnors differ distinctly,1° thus there is an imperative need
8 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) which deals with direct, criminal contempt provides that if the contempt occurs in the presence of the judge, it can be
punished summarily, i.e., without notice, hearing or opportunity to defend.
See text discussion at note 82 infra.
9 Under historical English equity procedures, the parallel classification
was "ordinary-extraordinary" rather than criminal-civil contempt. United
States v. Anonymous, 21 F. 761, 767 (Tenn. Cir. 1884).
10 A criminal contempt carries with it many of the aspects of a standard
criminal prosecution. A criminal contempt sentence is pardonable. Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925); Ex parte Magee, 31 N.M. 276, 242 P. 332
(1925) ; Contra, State v. Shumaker 200 Ind. 716, 164 N.E. 408 (1928). A
civil contempt sentence is not. h. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER,
48 (1963).
A criminal contempt has a six month limitation on the length of imprisonment without trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), see text
discussion at note 109 infra. A civil contempt has no such limitation. If
a contempt consists of disobedience to a court order, the contemnor may be
imprisoned until he complies, which may be for an indefinite time period.
Reeder v. Morton-Gregson Co., 296 F. 785 (8th Cir. 1924).
A criminal
contempt must be for a definite time period. State ex r-el. Grebstein v.
Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930). This procedure has been upheld
on the grounds that the contemnor "holds the keys to his own prison."
Reeder v. Morton-Gregson, supra; Bloom supra. This procedure has been
criticized because the incarceration for failure to act is as much a punishment
as a coercion. GOLDFARB, supra.
The criminal contemnor can assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) ; Root v.
McDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E.2d 684 (1927); People v. Spain, 307
Ill. 283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923). The civil contemnor cannot assert this privilege. State v. Treon, 188 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio App. 1963). In a criminal
contempt proceeding, the burden of proof is the same as in an ordinary
criminal prosecution, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt. Nilva v. United States,
352 U.S. 385 (1957) ; Root v. MacDonald, supra. In civil contempt, clear and
convincing evidence, something beyond a preponderance but something less
than the reasonable doubt test is required. Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358,
364 (1928).
A criminal contempt sentence is final and appealable by the contemnor.
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 249 F. 736 (9th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 248 U.S.
559 (1918). It can also be appealed by the government. United States v.
Hoffman, 161 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1947) which was appealed by the prosecu-
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Drawing the line, however, has

met with much difficulty.11
One attempt to formulate a cogent method of distinction
is the "purpose of the punishment" test enunciated in Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.' 2 The test states that if the punishment is remedial and is intended to serve the purposes of the
complainant, the contempt is civil.' 3 If the punishment is punition in 336 U.S. 77 (1948).
However, a judgment of guilt is not a felony
conviction. United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1962) rev'd on
other grounds, 335 U.S. 77 (1948).
Compulsion and compensation are proper remedies in a civil contempt
case but not in a criminal case. State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, supra.
Meyers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1923) suggests that by classifying
the contempt proceeding as "sui generis," the court can examine the overall characteristics of each individual case and proceed to classify it
accordingly.
11 E.g., Penfield v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585 (1947) wherein the act of contempt was the failure to provide documents to the S.E.C. The district court
found the contempt to be criminal but the court of appeals found it to be
civil. The Supreme Court affirmed the civil classification holding that there
was a dual purpose in civil contempts, i.e., to vindicate the public interest
and to compel and coerce conduct. See the discussion of Ohio v. Local 5760,
USW, 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (1961) at note 31 infra. The line
distinguishing between the two has been characterized as shadowy and
obscure. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1946).
12 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
See Note, 46 YALE L.J. 326 (1936) which discusses the following alternate tests for determining between civil and criminal contempt:
1. The method of initiating prosecution. Wakefield v. Housel, 288
F. 712 (8th Cir. 1923); Denny v. State, 203 Ind. 682, 182 N.E.
313 (1932).
2. The nature of the order violated with emphasis upon whether the
status quo could be re-established or upon the positive or negative
wording of the order. Reeder v. Morton-Gregson Co., 296 F. 785 (8th
Cir. 1924) ; Lester v. People, 150 Ill. 408, 37 N.E. 1004 (1890) ; State v.
Knight, 3 S.D. 509, 54 N.W. 412 (1893).
3. Whether or not the contemnor was a party to the original suit.
Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U.S. 324 (1903); Hammond Lumber Co. v.
Sailors' Union, 167 F. 809 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1909). Contra, O'Brien v.
People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N.E. 108 (1905).
Courts have discussed the following formalities in distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt:
1. The title of the proceeding. Wakefield, supra.
2. The nature of the relief sought. Lamb v. Crammer, 285 U.S.
217 (1932).
3. Whether the contemnor did or did not testify. Mitchell v. Dexter,
244 F. 926 (1st Cir. 1917) ; Wakefield, supra.
4. The identity of the prosecutor. In re Guzzardi, 74 F.2d 671 (2d
Cir. 1935) ; In re Kahn, 204 F. 581 (2d Cir. 1913).
13 In Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U.S. 324 (1903), the Court recognized this
classification for the first time in order to define the correct procedure for
punishment of the contemnor who had violated an injunction. Previously,
contempt had been reviewable only on writs of certiorari or prohibition,
questioning the lower court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in stating
that contempt was within its appellate jurisdiction, held contempt to be a
crime and impliedly adopted the lower court's classification.
Formerly,
no court reviewed the contempt proceeding of another. Ex parte Kearney,
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 37 (1822). For a more recent case in accord, see State
ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930). Now, however, most contempts are reviewable on a writ of error. Brimson v. State,
63 Ohio 347, 58 N.E. 803 (1900).
Civil contempt, however, is generally
reviewable by appeal. Lamb v. Crammer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932); Vilter Mfg.
Co. v. Humphrey, 132 Wis. 587, 112 N.W. 1095 (1907).

19701

Summary Punishment of Contemptuous Attorney

tive in nature, designed to vindicate an affront to the authority of
4
the court, the contempt is criminal.1

The "purpose of the punishment" test, which is most frequently applied, has been criticized because the character and
purpose of the punishment is determinative of the nature of the
act. Therefore, there can be no expectation before the decision
of punishment of what that determination will be. The determination thus is a subjective matter left with the decision maker
and does not adequately inform the potential contemnor of which
class of acts are prohibited and therefore what his duties and
liabilities are.' 5 In McCann v. New York Stock Exchange,16
Judge Learned Hand stated that this classification technique
had defeated its own purposes by failing to advise the defendant at the outset of the nature of the case against him. In
response to this case, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
were amended to include a requirement of notice and hearing
in certain cases." The clarity of this provision was blurred by
United States -v. United Mine Workers18 which held that the
same act can be classified as both criminal and civil contempt
notwithstanding the fact that procedural protections are likely
9
to become obscured.1
Other formulas for distinguishing between civil and criminal contempts suggest that if the contempt consists of passive
non-compliance between parties or inaction regarding civil obligations

resulting in private injury, the offense. is civil.2°

Criminal contempt, however, consists of misbehavior obstructing the administration of justice. 21 Since criminal contempts
are positive acts constituting interference with the law, they
are considered to be public offenses. 22
In addition to the civil-criminal classification, there is the
direct-indirect classification. 2 Therefore, a civil or criminal
contempt is of a direct or indirect nature. To be considered
14 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., note 12 supra.
15 R. GOLDFARB, note 10 supra at 57.
16 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935).

'7

FED. R.

CRIM.

P. 42(b) provides that if the judge has not certified

that the contempt occurred in his presence and that he saw and heard the
contempt, that the contempt shall be prosecuted on notice and hearing.
See note 34 infra for a full statement of this rule.
1
18 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
19 Id. at 303. The single act which was adjudged to be both criminal
and civil contempt was the violation of a temporary restraining order by the
union and its president.
20 The passive non-compliance-positive obstruction distinction was suggested by S. RAPALJE, in TREATISE ON CONTEMPT, (1884). J. OSWALD,
CONTEMPT OF COURT, (1911) suggested the distinction between civil obliga-

tions and interferences with the law.

21 See Gompers, note 12 supra and People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 106
N.E.2d 333 (1952).
22See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
23 Illinois decisions recognizing this distinction, e.g., People v. Harrison,
403 Ill. 302, 324, 86 N.E.2d 208, 210 (1949); People ex rel. Andrews v.
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direct, the contempt must be an act committed "in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice ....
,,24 Illinois cases have given a broad
interpretation to this definition.25 People ex rel. Chicago Bar
Association v. Barasch26 held that acts actually committed outside the presence of the judge but admitted in open court constituted direct contempt. 27 People v. Parker2 stated that a
contempt committed in any place set aside for the use of any
constituent part of the court during its session is committed "in
the presence of the court. ' 29 The mere filing with the clerk of a
document containing contemptuous matter is contemptuous according to People v. Howarth.3°
Indirect, or constructive, contempts consist of those acts of
misbehavior committed outside the actual physical presence of
the court.3 1 Indirect contempts are often those committed by
a publication which is distinct from the court geographically,
Hassikis, 6 Ill. 2d 463, 466 129 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1955).
24 This language is lound in 18 U.S.C. §401 (1964) which gives the
United States Courts the power to punish such contempts. §401 does not
designate whether this contempt is direct or indirect, however. See note
38 infra. Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure adopts
similiar language, i.x., "committed in the actual presence of the court,"
when outlining the procedure for summary punishment.
25People v. Sleezer, 8 Ill. App. 2d 130 N.E.2d 302 (1955) aff'd, 10
Ill. 2d 151, 139 N.E.2d 262 (1956) held that any conduct which tends to
embarrass the court or obstruct it in the administration of justice is direct
contempt. People v. Hagopian, 408 Ill. 618, 621, 97 N.E.2d 782 (1951) held
that direct contempts are not limited to those acts committed in open court
and within the "ocular" view of the judge.
For a case narrowly construing the direct, criminal contempt concept,
see Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1954) wherein an
attorney approached a witness and his wife in the hall of the courthouse
and threatened them with harm if the witness turned state's evidence. The
court held that 18 U.S.C. §401 (1964) (see note 38 infra) must be narrowly
construed to bedrock cases where the concession of this summary power to
the courts is necessary to enable them to preserve their authority and to
insure maintenance of order and decorum in the courtroom.
26406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E.2d 148 (1950).
27 The alleged contempt here was practicing law without a license.
The court distinguished indirect contempt from direct as one in which the
whole or essential part of the act occurred out of the presence of the court.
Therefore, proof and a hearing were required.
28 328 Ill. App. 46, 65 N.E.2d 457 (1946), aff'd, 396 Ill. 583, 72 N.E.2d
848, aff'd, 333 U.S. 571 (1948). Here, the party, a non-attorney, was
ordered to produce documents but instead filed an affidavit containing
scandalous charges against public officials, including the judge.
29 Id. at 56, 65 N.E.2d at 462.
20 415 Ill. 499, 114 N.E.2d 785 (1953).
The contemnors filed a petition
requesting a special prosecutor in an embezzlement case. It contained defamatory language concerning a court official.
81 E.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941) wherein the contemnors
induced an administrator to take unwarranted actions in order to illegally
terminate a wrongful death suit. The contemptuous behavior occurred
more than one hundred miles from the court. In Nilva v. United States,
352 U.S. 385 (1957), the Court failed to mention the direct-indirect classification but treated the contempt as indirect because the contemnor was
afforded a hearing. Here, the contemptuous act was the failure to produce
sufficient documents under a subpoena duces tecum. Seemingly contra is
Ohio v. Local 5760, USW, 172 Ohio St. 75, 173 N.E.2d 331 (1961) wherein
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unless the publication causally affects the administration of
32
justice. In such a case, the contempt is considered criminal.
It is imperative that this direct-indirect distinction be
made when the contempt is of a criminal rather than a civil
nature. Rule 42(a) (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs this situation. Rule 42(a), which applies to
direct criminal contempts, states that if the judge certifies that
he saw or heard the contempt and that it was actually committed in the presence of the court, then it may be dealt with
summarily. 33 Rule 42(b) states that for those contempts not
described in 42(a), the contemnor shall be accorded notice and
a hearing, allowing adequate time to prepare a defense. It also
provides that if this indirect contempt involves criticism of the
judge, that judge is disqualified from sitting at the trial or hearing. 3 4 It is the type of contempt covered by 42 (a) that is the
subject of this comment.
Behavior Which Has Been Found to be Contemptuous on the
Part of Counsel
Clashes between attorneys and judges are not a recent
the act of contempt consisted of picketers preventing a sheriff from executing
an order to take possession of trailers located on the picketed property.
The trial court found the union guilty of direct contempt regardless of the
fact that a state statute classified resistance to process as indirect contempt.
Note however, that the contemnors were afforded a hearing to determine
the Iacts. The classification of this contempt as direct but the employment
of a procedure used only in indirect contempts indicates the confusion involved
32 in making this distinction.
E.g., McCann v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935), where
the defendant sued 600 parties alleging conspiracy under the anti-trust
law. While the suit was pending, he sent a series of broadsides to all the
parties in violation of a court order.
3 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) entitled "Summary Disposition" reads:

A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies
that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it
was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered
of record.
34 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) entitled "Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing" provides as follows:
A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule
shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place
of hearing allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense,
and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt
charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the
judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application
of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court
for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The
defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of
Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided
in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or
hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a verdict or finding
of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) as the forerunner of
this rule. Cooke held that when the contempt consisted of a personal attack
upon the judge the judge may properly ask that another judge hear the
matter. (Emphasis added) For the present status of this concept, see
text at note 125 infra.
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phenomena. The first notable case on record in the United
States is the celebrated Peck case. 5 The alleged contempt by
the lawyer in that incident consisted of publishing criticism of
Judge Peck's opinion delivered in a case in which the lawyer
appeared as counsel. As punishment, Judge Peck imprisoned
and disbarred the lawyer.3 6 This action resulted in impeachment proceedings against Judge Peck which failed by a senatorial vote of 22 to 21. 37 This case led to the passage, in 1831,
of the first legislation curtailing the contempt power of judges. 8
Congressman James Buchanan, a sponsor of the act, in
protesting the procedure for punishing contempts against attorneys stated:
Without either an information or an indictment, but merely a
rule to show cause, drawn up in any form the judge may think
proper, a man is put upon his trial for an infamous offence, involv-

ing in its punishment the loss both of liberty and property. He
is deprived both of petit jury and grand jury, and is tried by an
35 W.

STANSBURY,

REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES PECK

(1833).

STANSBURY,

REPORT

(1833).

W. STANSBURY, note 35 supra. Today, the power of a federal court
to punish an attorney for contempt is limited to punishment by fine or
imprisonment. Phelan v. People of Guam, 394 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1968).
However, such contempt proceeding may lead to a disbarment action in
a state proceeding as is illustrated by Isserman v. Ethics Comm., 9 N.J.
269, 87 A.2d 903, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953) wherein the Essex County
Bar Association, through the Supreme Court of New Jersey, permanently
disbarred Isserman as a result of the contempt citations he incurred in the
case of Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). Justices Douglas and
Black dissented when the Court denied certiorari, stating that the state
had failed to afford Isserman an adequate hearing as required by due process.
Isserman had been allowed to make oral argument and present a formal
answer but was not allowed to offer evidence or confront the witnesses
against him. The state court had rendered its decision on the basis of the
citations as handed down by the federal judge which were given summarily,
that is, without notice, hearing or jury trial.
36

37 W.

OF THE

TRIAL OF JAMES PECK

A broad grant of power to the courts was given by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, see note 6 supra. The occasions for the exercise thus conferred
were left undefined. §1 of Act, March 2, 1831 curtailed the power as follows:
That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall not
be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any
person or persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehaviour of any of
the officers of the said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts, party, juror,
witness, or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts.
The present day equivalent to this power is 18 U.S.C. §401 (1964):
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none
other, as
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto
as to obstruct the administration of justice;
(2) Misbehaviour of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful order, rule, decree or
command.
For a federal case advocating a narrow restriction of this power, see
Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312 (1st Cir. 1954).
An attorney is not considered an officer of the court to whom §401(2)
applies. Crammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956).
3
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angry adversary prepared to sacrifice him and his rights on the
altar of his own vengeance.39
Thus, the controversy concerning the type of procedure that
should be employed in the punishment of contempt is not a new
issue.
The type of behavior found to be directly and criminally
contemptuous at the trial level will, by the nature of the offense,
depend upon the facts of the situation and upon the sensibilities of the presiding judge. However, in examining the treatment of these contempt citations by appellate and supreme
courts, certain trends emerge.
In most cases, an element of wilfullness or hostility must
be evident in order for the contempt citation to be upheld. In
Phelan v. People of Guam,'40 counsel commented on a court ruling foreclosing further questioning, stating that he was precluded from further cross-examination. 41 The trial judge found
this remark to be contemptuous on the ground that the attorney's line of questioning would be repetitive. 42 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the contempt citation
holding that the record showed no defiance or hostility nor an
obstruction of the trial. 3 In Raiden v. Superior Court for Los
Angeles County," counsel's expression that a prior order of the
court defeated the cause of justice was held not to constitute
contempt because it could not be shown to be made in the absence of good faith. 4 5 In Lewis v. Rice4 the court implied that
an attorney could charge in good faith, without being contemptuous, that the judge was biased and prejudiced and
would not afford a party a fair trial if the allegations of fact
were couched in courteous and respectful language.47 Here,
however, because the motion to vacate contained scandalous
and defamatory personal charges against the judge, it was
8
contemptuous.4
Another instance in which a disrespectful remark was held
not to be contemptuous occurred in White v. State.49 Here, the
attorney stated, "Well, regardless of the innermost thinking
39 Quote given as reported in Crammer v. United States, note 38 supra.
40 394 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1968).
41 Id. at 294-5.
42 Id. at 295.
4Id at 296. Here counsel merely defended in good faith the properness
of his question. Accord, In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962) which held
that a lawyer, in protesting his client's case strenuously and persistently,
cannot be held in contempt so long as he does not cause an obstruction which
interferes with the judge s performance of his judicial duty.
44 34 Cal. 2d 83, 206 P.2d 1081 (1949).
4: Id. at 87, 206 P.2d at 1083.
4 261 S.W.2d 804 (1953).
47 Id. at 805.
48 Id.
40 218 Ga. 290, 127 S.E.2d 668 (1962).
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Sir, outside I have tried to maintain respect for this court,
Sir."' 5 This remark grew out of a disagreement as to the
soundness of a certain legal prosecution. The Supreme Court
of Georgia held that the contempt citation was an abuse of the
trial judge's discretion because he knew of counsel's ill health
5
and because the case by its nature was charged with emotion. 1
The decision also rested on the fact that in spite of the disrespect that the attorney may have felt toward the judge, he was
amenable to the court in his outward manifestations, particularly in his use of courteous language. A case which goes a
52
step further is Gallagher v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles.
Here, the attorney urged an untenable position. Judge Traynor, in a California Supreme Court decision, held that this was
within an attorney's rights so long as he did not resort to
deceit or wilful obstruction of orderly process. 53 The case presented a fact issue as to whether or not the attorney's conduct
was actually contemptuous. The record, according to the Supreme Court, failed to reveal improper conduct. 54 The contempt
citation merely recited that the attorney was insolent and boisterous. 55 The court held that in a situation such as this, if the
attorney subjects the judge to ridicule and insult by intonations
or gestures which accompany words which the record reveal
to be wholly innocuous, the attorney should be warned
that such.
5
conduct is offensive before being held in contempt.
In MacInnis v. United States,57 the remarks, "You should
cite yourself for misconduct," and "You ought to be ashamed
of yourself," 5" were upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit as contemptuous. These remarks grew out of a disagreement between judge and counsel over a ruling. In upholding the
trial court's ruling that the statements were contemptuous "per
se," the court stated that a disagreement of this nature gives no
50 Id. at 292, 127 S.E.2d at 670.
51 Id. at 298, 127 S.E.2d at 673. The case was a child custody hearing in
which counsel stated that he hoped to avoid getting the judge's "dander up."
52 31 Cal. 2d 784, 192 P.2d 905 (1948).
Here the attorney attempted
to take part in the investigation of his client's reported attempt to bribe
jurors. The Supreme Court of California stated that not allowing this
participation was within the lower court's discretion but that a mistaken act
of counsel prior to that determination was not contemptuous.
53 Id. at 795, 192 P.2d at 913.
54 Id. at 794, 192 P.2d at 912.
55 Id. Because of the -right to appeal a contempt conviction, the certificate of contempt must set forth a written order giving the facts. People v.
Loughran, 2 Ill. 2d 258, 118 N.E.2d 310 (1954). A recitation of conclusions
without sufficient facts upon which they rest makes appellate review impossible. Great Lakes Screw Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 409 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1969).
Accord, Gallagher v. Muncipal Court, note 52 supra. For an example of a
deficient certificate, see Tauber v. Gordon, 350 F.2d 843 (3rd Cir. 1965).
56 Id. at 796, 192 P.2d at 913.
57 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951).
5S8Id.

at 159-60.
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right to flagrant and open defiance of the court's authority.,"

However, a similar remark, i.e., "I think your bias is showing" was not upheld as contemptuous by the Illinois Appellate

Court.6

As the basis of its decision, the court took notice that the

trial judge acted intemperately by terminating a line of questioning and characterizing the questions as ridiculous when in fact
they were proper. The judge also foreclosed questions which
were not objected to by the opposing counsel. 61 In Schlesinger

Petition,62 where the judge repeatedly asked counsel if he was
a Communist, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that an
attorney's reaction to the intemperate actions of the judge could
not be held contemptuous. 3 In Offutt v. United States,6 4 the
Supreme Court developed the same line of reasoning. Here the
judge became personally embroiled with defense counsel. 65 In
reversing the citation, the Court stated that although the actions

of the attorney may have been reprehensible, they could not be
considered apart from the actions of the trial judge. 66
In re McConnell67 and Hallinan v. United States68
implied

that if counsel persists in the course of behavior which has been
repeatedly admonished against by the court, this conduct is a
wilful obstruction of justice69 In McConnell, counsel violated an

order to discontinue an offer of proof. The Supreme Court held
that this action did not exceed the line of duty if done in good
59 Id. at 159.
60 People v. Pearson, 98 Ill. App. 2d 203, 211, 240 N.E.2d 337, 341 (1968).
61 Id. at 212, 240 N.E.2d at 341.

62367 Pa. 476, 81 A.2d 316 (1951).
The action here was one for trespass.
The judge asked counsel if he had used his office to harbor a Communist front
organization and other similar questions. Counsel's alleged contempt was
the refusal to answer and the asking of the judge to disqualify himself.
The Supreme Court, in reversing quoted from Ex parte Senior, 37 Fla. 1, 15,
19 So. 652, 653 (1896) which held:
It can not certainly be true that the decision of an inferior court adjudging the matter to be contempt precludes all investigation as to the
legality or proper authority of the court to make such order.
The lower court case involved the prosecution
64348 U.S. 11 (1954).
of an abortionist who Offutt was defending. Peckham v. United States, 210
F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
65 A few examples of the responses of the judge illustrate the point.
When Mr. Offutt stated that he misunderstood a court ruling, the judge
replied, "You can't be as stupid as all that." On another occasion the judge
replied to Mr. Offutt, "Just a moment. If you say another word, I will have
the Marshall stick a gag in your mouth." Peckham v. United States, note
64 supra at 704.
66 348 U.S. 11 (1954). In reaching this conclusion, the court took note
of the record and stated that the judge's behavior was not:
63 Id. at 482, 81 A.2d at 317.

...
a rare flareup, not a show of evanescent irritation - a modicum of
His behavior precluded that
quick temper. . .'allowed even judges. ...

atmosphere of austerity which should especially dominate a criminal
trial and which is indispensable for an appropriate sense of responsibility on the part of court, counsel, and jury.
Id. at 17.
67 370 U.S. 230 (1962).

,8 182 F,2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950).
'69370 U.S. 230, 236 (19621; 182 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1950).
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faith,7 0 but implied that a continuance in the line of conduct
after repeated warnings negates any presumption of good faith.
In Hallinan the attorney repeatedly included improper subject
matter in his opening statement after several admonitions from
the judge. This action was held to be a wilful obstruction, showing a deliberate design to ignore the ruling
of the court and to
71
get the excluded matter before the jury.
In State v. Caffrey,7 2 counsel made a remark which he
claimed to be a Shakespearean aside, not intended for the ears
of the judge. The facts were that the court asked counsel to be
seated after he addressed the court in a loud, insulting manner.
Counsel replied, "It won't be necessary, Your Honor, I'm getting
out of this court, if you can call it a court."73 The last part of
this statement was not intended to be heard by the judge. The
Supreme Court of Washington held this remark to be even more
contemptuous than if it were intended to be heard. 74 According
to Parmelee TransportationCo. v. Keeshin,75 where counsel remarked, "That is crazy" in response to a ruling, if the comment is
intended for the ears of co-counsel and there is no evidence that
the judge heard it at the time of its making, the conduct will not
be upheld as contemptuous, in spite of the fact that it was made
76
in the presence and within the hearing of the jury.
Analysis of the above cases indicates two major generalizations. First, statements which, although viewed by the trial
judge as contemptuous, if made in good faith, without defiance or
a wilful design to obstruct justice, will not be upheld as contemptuous. Second, conduct on the part of counsel, regardless of
its reprehensible nature, cannot be viewed separately from that
of the trial judge.77
The Nature of the Summary Procedure
When an attorney is cited for contempt, the citation and
sentencing usually occur at either of two times: directly and
immediately after the contumacious remark or action is committed, or at the end of the trial. If the act of contempt is of an
isolated nature, occurring in an otherwise orderly trial, the citation usually is made immediately or within a short time after
the incident.78 The timing of the citation is not regulated by
statute in the federal courts and is left in the discretion of the
370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962).
behavior objected to took two forms. First, Mr. Hallinan anticipated the identity of 125 government witnesses in his opening statement and
proceeded in a wholesale attack of their credibility. In doing so, he anticipated much of the government's case, indulging in speculation. Secondly,
he continued in a cross-examination of a witness after being admonished
against doing so.
7270 Wash. 2d 120, 422 P.2d 307 (1966).
73Id. at 121, 422 P.2d at 308.
Counsel's brief presented an issue of
70

71 The
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judge.7 9 In the rare case of a disruptive course of conduct which
continues throughout the entire trial, judges have waited until
the jury has returned its verdict and been dismissed and then
have cited and sentenced the contumacious attorney. This is a
procedure followed in the only cases of this type: the Conspiracy
Trial"0 and Sacher v. United States.8'
Contemnors invariably insist that the meaning to be given to
82
the word "summary" refers to the timing of the punishment.
The argument is made that if the court waits until overnight or
until the end of the trial to punish the contempt, the proceeding
has lost its summary nature and should be tried under Rule 42 (b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for
notice and hearing.8 3 The argument has been supported by some
Supreme Court Justices in dissenting opinions who have added
that Rule 42 (a) not only permits but requires instant exercise
fact as to the manner in which the words were spoken. Counsel contended
that he spoke them softly whereas the citation stated that they were spoken
in a "loud, angry, insulting . . .manner." The court quoted State v. Zioncheck 171 Wash. 388, 394, 18 P.2d 35, 37 (1933) which stated :
[Much depends upon the manner, expression, and attitude of the party
adjudged in contempt in addressing the court.... A finding of contempt
is not necessarily based alone upon the language used. The contempt
may largely exist in the manner in which the words are spoken....
7470 Wash. 2d 120, 122, 422 P.2d 307, 308 (1966).
75292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961).
7 Id. at 808.
77 Two minor conclusions are also possible:
(1) That a protestation of a non-personal nature which is couched in
courteous language will not be upheld as contemptuous.
. (2) That to be obstructive, the remark must actually be heard by the
court and there should be a record of it.
78In Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d 279 (1968), the judge cited and
sentenced the attorney the next day. In State v. Caffrey, 70 Wash. 2d 120,
422 P.2d 307 (1966) and In re Gates, 248 A.2d 671 (D.C. 1968), the citing
and sentencing occurred immediately.
7 See the statement of FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) (b) at notes 33 and 34
supra. See also Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 10 (1952). However,
this discretion has been limited upon occasion as in Parmelee Trans. Co. v.
Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961) wherein the attorney at one point in
the trial used the term "sardonic" to characterize a ruling of the judge.
Five months later, the judge learned the meaning of the term and then
entered the citation on that particular point. This act was struck down by
the court of appeals.
That the procedure employed by trial judges has not been uniform is
acknowledged by the Court in Sacher supra at 7.
filed Feb. 15, 1970), appeal docketed, No.
80 No. 69 CR 180 (N.D. Ill.,
1-8294, 7th Cir., Feb. 26 1970.

81343 U.S. 1 (1952S.
82 Id. at 9. This point was elevated to a Jurisdictional level by the

accused in MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (1951) wherein the court
waited until the next day after the contumacious remark occurred for the
citation and sentenced the attorney at the trial's end. The contemnor contended that by not citing and sentencing the contemnor immediately, the court
lost its jurisdiction to punish summarily. The court held that the jurisdiction
attached immediately upon the commission of the contempt and was not
surrendered by waiting until the next day. It stated that immediate vindication of the dignity of the court means speedy vindication but does not require
steps which would disrupt the trial.
83 Sacher v. United States, note 81 supra at 7 where the contemnors
based this contention upon two arguments:
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because if the emergency is survived, the need for summary
punishment no longer exists .'
Courts have not agreed with this interpretation, however,
and hold that "summary" refers to the type of procedure employed rather than to the timing of the procedure. 5 This procedure is one which dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from issuance of process, service of
complaint and answer, holding hearings ... and all that goes with
a conventional court trial.8 6 The contention is that the reason for
a conventional trial is to determine the facts. Because the events
have occurred within the view of the judge, the need for this
7
procedure is dispensed with.
The Supreme Court in Sacher stated that no possible prejudice against contemnors could occur by waiting until the end of
the trial, and, in fact, an immediate punishment could prejudice
the contemnor during the trial in the eyes of the jury.8 8 The
Sacher Court also stated that a mid-trial citation would be obstructive to a smooth running proceeding particularly because
of the need for substitution of counsel.8 9 The Court stated that
a short delay is laudable so as to insure that any punishment is
not meted out in the heat of the moment.90 Because the integrity
and efficiency of the administration of the proceeding are the
greatest considerations, the moment when the citations are declared should be left in the discretion of the judge. 1
One criticism of the procedure of waiting until the end of the
trial for citation of the attorney is that it is possible that he may
be engaging in conduct which the trial court regards as contumacious without knowledge that it is so regarded. In Hallinan92 and MacInnis,93 the trial court employed a hybrid procedure
which eliminates thig problem. Here the judges cited the attor(1) That since the trial judge waited until the trial's end, no possible
obstruction could occur and therefore, no need for summary punishment
existed.,
(2) That because a portion of the citation contained a charge of conspiracy to disrupt the trial and because the, judge could not have heard
any such argument, the contemnors were entitled to notice and hearing
before an impartial judge.
This first' contention 'is supported by State v. Treon, 188 N.E.2d 308
(Ohio App. 1963) wherein the court held that to constitute direct contempt,
the misbehavior must require immediate punishment to preserve the court's
authority.
'84 See the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurter in
Sacher, 343 U.S. 1, 14, 23 (1952).
85 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
86 Id.

87 Id.
"Id.
8
at 10.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 41.
91 Id. at 11.
'92:182 F. 2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950).'
93 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951).
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neys for contempt during the trial, thereby informing them that
their conduct was regarded as obstructive, but waited until the
end of the trial for sentencing. The trials proceeded without
disruption in spite of the citations because the attorneys involved
were allowed to continue the defense of their clients. This type
of proceeding has been approved by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
9 4
his dissenting opinion in Sacher
History and Rationale of the
Summary Punishment of Contempt
Since the reign of Edward I, it has been established that the
courts have the power to punish contempt committed in open
court.9 5 From the founding of the United States, the constitutionality of this power has been little doubted.9 6 Congress provided for it in the act creating the federal courts.9 7 When abuses
under this power have manifested themselves, Congress, in
corrective legislation, has concerned itself with defining situations when the power can be properly exercised and with procedures for its use, but has not denied its existence. s However,
Justice Black has stated that:
[t]he early precedents which laid the groundwork for this line of
authorities were decided before the actual history of the procedures
used to punish contempt was brought to light, at a time when
'wholly unfounded assumptions about 'immemorial usuage' acquired
a factitious authority and were made the basis of legal decision.' 99
He contends that the cases which have adherred to the summary
power without question have
erroneously assumed that courts have always possessed the power
...and that it inhered in their very being without supporting their
suppositions by authority or reason. Later cases merely cite the
earlier ones in a progressive cumulation while uncritically repeating their assumptions about 'immemorial usage" and "inherent
necessity." 100
Recent scholarship has exploded the myth of immemorial
94343 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1952).
95 Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 Haav. L. REV. 161
(1908).
96 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's discussion and the Court's footnote in
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 190-91 (1958) wherein he cites 42
Supreme Court cases which have upheld this power.
97 See note 6 supra.

91 E.g., 18 U.S.C. §3285 (1964) which is the federal statute of limitations

stating that no proceeding for criminal contempt shall be instituted unless
begun one year after the date of the act complained of.

42 U.S.C. §1995 (1964) which limits the fine on a natural person violat-

ing the Civil Rights Act to $1,000 and the imprisonment to six months.

The right to a jury trial is within the discretion of the judge but if the
conviction occurs in a non-jury trial, the fine is limited to $300 and the imprisonment to 45 days.
9 356 U.S. 165, 196 (1958) wherein the Court quoted from Frankfurter
and. Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts, 37 HARv. L. REV. 1010, 1011

.(1924).

.

:.:.100356 U.S.- 165,196 (1958).
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usage.101 Until the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century,
the English courts, with the exception of the Court of Star
Chamber, did not have the power of summary punishment. Prior
contempts were tried in the normal course of criminal law, including a jury trial. 10 2

After the Star Chamber was abolished,

this summary power crept into the common law courts. In 1765,
Justice Wilmot declared in an undelivered opinion in The King v.
Almon that the courts had exercised the power to try all contempts summarily since their creation. This much quoted opinion
was never actually handed down and was published only after
his death. Wilmot's thesis has been accepted by American
courts with little dissent 0 3 but with the Peck case, its abuses
were early recognized' 0 4
The rationale behind this power is twofold. First, some
immediate means to discipline the offender is needed in order
to preserve the dignity and authority of the court. 10 5 This means
of discipline is necessary to maintain courtroom control and thus
the protection of our institutions.106 Second, where the judge has
personally observed the contemnor's misbehavior, the usual mode
of proof and need for a trier of fact is unnecessary.' 0 7 However,
this concept has not been blindly accepted 08 and the minority
101 Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Contempts, note 99 supra.
102

Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARv. L. REv.

161 (1908).

1o See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's discussion and the Court's footnote in
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 190-91 (1958) wherein he cites 42
Supreme Court cases which have not questioned this power.
104 See text at note 35 supra.
The contemnors in the Sacher case urged that unreasonable use of this
power as applied to lawyers would have an intimidating effect upon the
profession, discouraging lawyers from defending those accused of offenses of
a political nature against the government. (Defendants in the proceeding
out of which the contempt citations arose were accused of being Communists.)
105 Commonwealth v. Langnes, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969) which
stated that the court had an inherent power to protect itself against insult
and abuse.
106 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
107 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952).
Jury Trial for Criminal Contempts: Restoring
Criminal Contempts Power and Protecting Defendants' Rights, 65 YALE L.J.
846 (1956) suggests four benefits to the administration of justice afforded by
summary punishment which would be non-existent if contempt were prosecuted in the customary manner:
(1) Speed of prosecution and punishment which may be necessary to
continue the principal proceedings.
(2) Avoidance of delays in the judicial process:
(a) Many criminal contempts must be resolved to adjudicate the
matters in the principal case.
(b) If the contempts were not prosecuted by the judges themselves,
they would be called away from their judicial duties to serve as witnesses.
(3) Increased deterence of contemptuous conduct.
(4) The threat of summary punishment promotes the dignity of the
courts because it is a means for securing respect and obedience.
108 Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Sacher, 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952) wherein
he states that the judge should not pass on the charges he has made and that
the contemnors were entitled to a jury trial with an opportunity to defend
themselves. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the same case. In
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), a 5-4 decision, the dissenters
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opinion became the majority opinion in Bloom v. Illinois."'9 Here,
the Court re-examined three recent cases holding that criminal
contempts could be constitutionally tried without a jury. The
Court held that criminal contempt is in every essential respect a
serious crime. 110 In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated
that a crime in the ordinary sense is a violation of the law, a
public wrong, and punishable by fine or imprisonment."' Even
when contempt is not a violation of a specific criminal law, the
conviction is still to be considered criminal because the impact
112
upon the defendant is the same, i.e., fine and/or imprisonment.
The function of the criminal contempt conviction is the same as
for other crimes, that is, to protect our institutions of government
and enforce their mandates. 11'
After determining that criminal contempt is a crime, the
Bloom Court examined whether or not it is the type to which
the jury trial provisions of the Constitution apply. Here, the
Court accepted its reasoning in Cheff v. Schnackenberg," and
United States v. Barnett, 15 which held that criminal contempt is
a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious one.
Bloom held that aside from the penalty imposed, criminal contempt is not intrinsically considered a serious offense requiring
the protection of the constitutional guarantee of the right to trial
by jury."1 6 However, because of the considerations which make
the right to trial by jury fundamental in criminal cases, there is
substantially no difference between serious contempts and other
serious crimes.'" In contempt cases, there is a compelling argument in favor of the right to jury trial as a protection against
the arbitrary exercise of official power. Contemptuous conduct
often strikes at the judge's most vulnerable and human qualities.
Even when the contempt is not personally directed at the judge,
it often represents a refraction of judicial authority or an interwere unanimous in stating that the contemnor had a right to a jury trial.
109 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The incident out of which this criminal contempt arose was the willful petitioning to probate of a falsely prepared
will. The contemnor, an attorney, was sentenced to a two-year prison term.
110 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).

M Id.

112 Id.
"'s Id.

11 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
115376 U.S. 681 (1964).
116 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968). For a discussion of contempt as a petty
offense with emphasis upon the Cheff and Barnett cases, see Constitutional
Law: The Supreme Court Constructs a Limited Right to Trial by Jury for
Federal Criminal Contemnors, 1967 DUKE L.J. 632 (1967).
117 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968). The Court has recognized several pro-

cedures which are or should be afforded the accused in both an ordinary

criminal case and in a criminal contempt proceeding:
(1) The presumption of innocence. Bloom supra at 205.
(2) The privilege against testifying against oneself. Accord, State v.
Treon, 188 N.E.2d 308 -(Ohio App. 1963).

(3) The right to a public trial before an impartial tribunal.

Bloom
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ference with the judicial process."" The Court, after examining
the history of the contempt power in the United States with
attention to its abuses, stated that this history demonstrates the
lack of wisdom of vesting the judiciary with completely untrammeled power to punish contempt and makes clear the need for
effective safeguards against that power's abuse. 119
The Court weighed the importance of the role which contempt prosecutions play in the proper functioning of the judicial
system against the need to protect the accused against abuses.
The second interest outweighs the first and therefore a right to
jury trial in serious contempt cases is imperative. 12 0 Convictions
for contempt often result in serious penalties that are indistinguishable from those obtained under ordinary laws. Therefore,
the right to jury trial which is fundamental
in criminal cases
12
must be extended to criminal contempts. 1
Finally, the Court addressed itself to the question of when a
contempt will be considered serious enough to warrant a jury
trial. It stated that when the legislature has not expressed a
judgment as to the seriousness of the offense by fixing a maximum penalty, the sentence actually imposed is the determining
factor. 22 Bloom was sentenced to a two-year imprisonment,
which could not be considered a petty offense. 1 2 The federal
statute sets the line between serious and petty offenses at a term
of six months imprisonment.124 Therefore, under the Bloom
mandate, no contemnor, regardless of the direct nature of his
criminal contempt, may be imprisoned for a term of more than
six months without a jury trial.
supra at 205.
(4) The right to confront witnesses against the accused. Nilva v.
United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957).
(5) The burden of proof must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nilva supra at 399.
The Nilva case, a 5-4 decision, involved an attorney who, as vice-president of a corporation, failed to produce documents under a subpoena duces
tecum. He was allowed a hearing and found guilty of indirect, criminal
contempt. The Court sustained the conviction. The four dissenting justices
held that the charges should have been tried before a different judge.
118 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).
11" Id. at 210.
120

Id. at 208-09.

121 Id. at 209.
12 2 Id. at 211.
123 Id.
124 18 U.S.C. §1 (1964)

entitled "Offenses Classified" states, "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period
of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty offense."
18 U.S.C. §402 (1964) entitled "Contempts Constituting Crimes" states:
. [B]ut in no case shall the fine . . . exceed . . . $1,000 . . . nor shall
such imprisonment exceed the term of six months .... " However, the next
paragraph states, "This section shall not be construed to relate to contempts
committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice .... "
See Note, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court Constructs a Limited
Right to Trial by Jury for Federal Criminal Contemnors, 1967 DuKi L.J.
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..
A second Supreme Court case, Offutt v. United States, 125 imports another major safeguard to the rights of the contemnor.
In Offutt, the trial judge of a federal court became personally
embroiled in protracted wrangling with the defense attorney.
The Court expanded a concept previously mentioned in Cooke v.

United States,12 6 which held that in such a situation, the judge
may properly request another judge to hear the contempt proceedings. 12 1 Offutt held that "the judge who imposed the sentence

herein should invite the Chief Judge of the District Court to
assign another judge to sit in the second hearing

.... -"12

In the

Offutt fact situation, the contempt was that of an attorney in
open court; that is, it was of a direct, criminal nature punishable
under 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. If

Offutt is to be applied to its fullest extent, a contemnor has a
right to a hearing with an impartial judge if the case was such
that the original judge became personally involved, regardless of

the procedure provided for by (42 (a)

.129

Only 42 (b) recognizes

this right and applies it only to cases of indirect criminal contempt. 130
The Court in Offutt did not, however, rely upon the due

process clause of the Constitution in its discussion of the right
to an impartial tribunal as did the Bloom Court with the right

to jury trial. Pursuant to its supervisory authority over federal
courts, it set aside the conviction and remanded the cause to the
district court with directions for the case to be tried under a
131
different judge.
The mandates of the Offutt and Bloom cases have been to a
large extent circumvented by the lower courts through the use
632. Footnote 84 at 654 suggests that over half the states limit the punishment of contempt to one year or less.
125 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
126267 U.S. 517 (1925).
127 See note 34 supra.

128 348 U.S. 11 18 (1954).
129 Kasson v. Auges, 390 F.2d 183 (3rd Cir. 1968).

The Offutt decision
would also contradict the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. §402 (1964) as
stated in note 124 supra.
180 Note 34 supra. There is 'no statute governing disqualification of
judges at the federal appellate level. 28 U.S.C. §25 (1964) provides for
disqualification for bias or prejudice for federal district court judges. Berger
v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) held that when the affidavit of the
party requesting a change of judge is filed, the judge in question should not
pass upon the truth or falsity of the charges but may pass on the sufficiency
of the affidavit itself. The courts have given a very narrow construction
to the term "bias." Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1927) ;
Johnson v. United States, 35 F.2d 355 (W.D. Wash. 1929). See Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947) and Criminal Procedure Contempt - Extent of Power of Trial Judge to Punish Summarily, 8 VAND.
L. REv. 643 (1955).
181 348 U.S. 11, 18.
See D. Weissman, Sacher and Isserman in the
Courts: Note 111, 15 L. GUILD REV. 67 (1955) and Criminal Law

-

Contempt

Judge-Attorney Relationship, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 760 (1955) for discussion
stating that Offutt in effect embodied the three man dissent in Sacher there-

-

fore reversing it.
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of various procedures. Bloom can be avoided by classifying each
disruptive act separately and then imposing a distinct sentence
of less than six months for each act. In this manner, contemnors
accumulate a period of imprisonment beyond the six month requirement of Bloom without being afforded a jury trial. 13 2 The
rationale supporting the use of this procedure is that to allow
concurrent sentences or to classify separate acts as one single
contempt would diminish the deterrent effect of the contempt
citation and allow the contemnor to continue his disruptive
course of conduct safe with the knowledge that his maximum
sentence without a jury trial would be six months. To allow this
would negate the purpose of the contempt citation, which is to
maintain order in the courtroom. 133
Another difficulty posed by Bloom involves the determination
of the seriousness of the contempt which must be decided before
the right to a jury trial arises. Bloom states that the seriousness
of the contempt, in the absence of a statute, will be determined
by the sentence actually imposed.' 3 4 Therefore, in order to determine whether or not the defendant is entitled to a jury trial,
the judge, in effect, must determine his guilt. This practice is
contrary to the fundamental concept of criminal justice that a
defendant is innocent until proven guilty. In addition, if the
court has prejudged the case in order to give the accused the
right to trial by jury, it is possible that the court's impartiality
is subject to question.
The primary weakness of the Offutt decision is that the
judge whose prejudice is in question is the one who determines
his own impartiality. 35 However, by the use of the word
"should" in the phrase ". . . should invite another judge. . ." the
Court implies a strong mandate. It has been proposed that those
individuals who are the most biased fancy themselves as the
132

E.g., Mayberry Appeal, 434 Pa. 478, 255 A.2d 131 (1969); United

States v. Dellinger, note 1 supra wherein Mr. Kunstler was found guilty
of 24 separate acts of contempt with sentences ranging from seven days
to six months with the total time of imprisonment because of consecutive

sentencing being four years, 13 days. In Yates v. United States, 350 U.S.
860 (1955), the defendant in a Communist Conspiracy trial under the Smith
Act took the stand and refused to answer 11 separate questions about her
associations. This was held to be 11 separate contempts with one year

sentences for each contempt to be served concurrently.

Contra, United

States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148, 160 (3rd Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Emspak,
95 F. Supp. 1012 (D.D.C. 1951); United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp.
991 (D. Hawaii 1950); United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
Is$ Mayberry Appeal, note 132 supra at 484, 255 A.2d at 135. See,

however, the dissent in the same case stating that a more realistic view would
be to treat the conduct of the contemnor throughout the trial as one contempt.
'"4 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968).

"Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias." In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); No man should judge his own cause.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927).
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most impartial.136 Under this method of choosing tribunals a
large number of appeals is likely.
The importance of an impartial tribunal in a contempt
proceeding has been recognized in other cases. 13 7
In his dissenting opinion in Sacher, a criminal contempt in open court,
Justice Frankfurter said:
The particular circumstances of this case compel me to conclude that the trial judge should not have combined in himself the
functions of accuser and judge. For his accusations were not impersonal ....

Whatever occasion may have existed during the trial

for sitting in judgment upon claims of personal victimization, it
ceased after the trial had terminated ....
All grants of power, including the verbally unlimited terms
of Rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, are subject to
the inherent limitation that the power shall be fairly used for the
purpose for which it is conferred ....

The rule merely permits

summary punishment. It does not command summary punishment
of all contempts "committed in the actual
presence of the court,"
38
in all circumstances and at any time.1
Frankfurter suggested that even in a case of protracted
wrangling, as in Sacher, summary measures are not necessary to
enable the trial to continue. 39 But if they are to be instituted,
the use of a procedure suggested by the courts in Hallinan"0 and
MacInnis14 would be preferable to awaiting the end of the trial
for citation and sentencing as was done in Sacher and upheld
14
by the majority of the Supreme Court.
As Rule 42 (a) (b) stands at the moment, it does not provide
for a hearing by an impartial tribunal when the contempt involves the judge personally unless the contempt is of an indirect
or constructive nature." 8 This does not provide for the fact
For examples where judges were held not to have abused this discretion,
see Cross Co. v. Local 155 UAW, 377 Mich. 202, 139 N.W.2d 694 (1966);
Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957) ; Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575,
592 (1964).
See Note and Comment, Courts: Contempt: Trial of Contemnor by
Contemned Judge, 21 CORN. L.Q. 313 (1936) which explains that the judge

is not trying his own cause because the offense is against the state and society.
136 See Sacher v. United States 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952).
'37 See the dissents in Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957) and in

Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 592 (1964) where Justice Douglas seeks
to elevate the right to an impartial tribunal in a criminal contempt case to a

Constitutional right as required by due process standards.

138 343 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1952).
'13 Id. at 40. Justice Frankfurter rejected the government contention

that if there was a hearing before another judge, this would give the contemnor an added opportunity to harass the judge and that to allow the judge

to be cross-examined would cause damaging controversy. He stated that
such a contention depreciates the status of federal judges. Respect for the

judiciary would better be served by exacting high standards of judicial competence rather than by asserting a power which violates due process. See
Pancio v. United States, 412 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1969).
14 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950).
141191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951).
142343
148

U.S. 1-14 (1952).

Note 34 supra.
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that most cases involving direct contempt in the open courtroom
will involve "disrespect or criticism" of the judge.1 4 ' This defect has been remedied to some extent by the Offutt decision.1 5
Another case has gone so far as to criticize 42 (b) for failing to
provide for an impartial tribunal in situations other than those
1 6
involving disrespect to the judge.
Conclusion
Rule 42(a) (b) grants unfettered power to the courts to
punish direct, criminal contempts. The abuses of this power
have been recognized by the Bloom and Offutt Courts. Yet the
mandates of these cases which grant to the contemnor the basic
procedural protection of a jury trial presided over by an impartial judge have been largely ignored or circumvented by the
lower courts. Rule 42 is no longer the codification of the case
law which it was when it was adopted in 1946. Because of the
growing number of trials involving defendants who challenge
the judicial system and counsel who must defend them under that
system, this rule should be revised so as to define a procedure
that would guarantee the contemnor his rights as already recognized by the Supreme Court.
It is suggested that the procedure should include provisions
such as the following:
(1)
Counsel should be cited for each contemptuous act
immediately after its occurrence.
(2)
Upon conclusion of the trial, an impartial judge should
review the record and impose the sentence.
(3)
If the sentences are to be served consecutively, and
the total time of imprisonment exceeds six months, or
if a single sentence exceeds six months, a jury trial
should be afforded the contemnor.
Merrilie W. Johnson

Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12 (1952).
See text at note 125 8upra.
146 Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 404 (1957).
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